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Col Bromley

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
16 June 1950

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Major General LeRoy S. Irwin
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
General Staff, United States Army
Washington 25, D. C.

My Dear General

Attached hereto is a "Report of Staff Visit to Hong Kong". This report was written by Colonel Louis J. Fortier, Director of my Theater Intelligence Division, based on a visit to Hong Kong from 29 April 1950 to 2 May 1950.

As expressed in my radio to you of 4 June 1950, I have the highest faith in Fortier's powers of observation and analysis.

I am also inclosing a copy of an earlier study by Fortier on "Hong Kong, Capacity for Defense 1941 - 1949".

CAWilloughby
C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Major General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

2 Incls
1. Rpt of Staff Visit to Hong Kong
2. Hong Kong, Capacity for Defense 1941 - 1949 — not rec'd from Tech Br. WBD

REGRADED: Unclassified
By authority of ACSI letter dated 24 March 1953
by DS Tait 1/13/60

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Theater Intelligence Division

May 1949

REGRADED: Confidential

By authority of ACSI letter dated [illegible]

DS Tan 1/13/60

SUBJECT: Staff Visit to Hong Kong

MEMO TO: Major General C. A. Willoughby, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, FEC

1. Synopsis of Hong Kong Visit.

a. Accompanied by Captain Orville E. Bloch, GSC, of Theater Intelligence, I spent four days (29 April-2 May) in Hong Kong and on the Kowloon Peninsula. Our journey from Tokyo, via Okinawa, was under the aegis of the 2143rd Air Weather Wing whose regional meeting in Hong Kong provided an excellent cover. Being in civilian clothes, I was neither observed nor disturbed by newsmen. While Bloch and I stopped at the Gloucester House, giving us maximum freedom of movement, both the British Land Forces (CG Gen Sir E. C. R. Mansergh) and the American Consulate (Hon Karl Rankin with personal rank of Minister) placed their personnel and plant at our disposal. The U.S. military contingent consists of Army, Navy, Air Assistant Attaches, accredited to London but detached to Hong Kong.

b. We met, were entertained by, and conferred with many persons, both military and civilian, representing a fair cross-section of opinion and knowledge of the area. We made a reconnaissance via jeep of the British defensive position on the Kowloon Peninsula as well as the outposts on the Sham Chun River, (the boundary). We observed the British field dispositions, and from two front-line observation posts we studied Communist Chinese terrain. Perhaps, most important we noted the psychological reaction to the recent conquest of Nanking for which our visit was particularly timely.

c. As an over-all impression, the present atmosphere of Hong Kong is neither cheerful nor conducive to any deep feeling of security.

2. The Terrain (Tab 1).

a. An analysis of the terrain having been made by me in my previous study (Hong Kong Capacity for Defense - 1941-1949), I shall not fatigue you with a detailed description of the various successive delaying positions. More to the point is the fact that having studied the terrain both on the map and on the ground, I was very much more interested in the British concept of defense given me orally by Brigadier R. S. K. Hammond, Chief of Staff, Land Forces. As viewed by Hammond the main defensive position is the one indicated on Tab 1. To preserve the principal reservoirs and to ensure the Kaitak Airfield the battle must be won in the valley north of this position, which incidentally offers excellent fields of fire. The British viewpoint thus coincides entirely with ours, as expressed in our studies.

(OK JW)

b. The British contemplate an initial delaying action on the river line boundary and have sited a certain number of trenches and field fortifications for this purpose.

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c. Quite properly the principal position has received the greatest attention and labor. Lateral roads have been constructed and jeep trails, both penetrating and lateral, have been built. (A 1/20,000 map showing the road system in detail is en route by pouch to me). Road construction is still in progress, using coolie labor under the Royal Engineers.

d. Should the main position fall, the British agree, the defense of Hong Kong becomes a siege operation destined eventually to capitulation unless superior reinforcements arrive.

3. The Armed Forces.

a. The Army (Tab 2).

You will recall that in my study of November 1949, as well as your personal observation of December 1949, we agreed that the 40th British Division and the three Marine Commando battalions (1 brigade) barely sufficed to man the main battle position and to preserve order in Hong Kong. The principal fighting brigade of the 40th Division, the Gurkha brigade with its two Gurkha battalions and one British battalion, has been moved to Malaya. The three Marine battalions (the backbone of the Hong Kong security force) leave this month - also for Malaya. The two remaining brigades of the 40th Division are composed primarily of short-term conscripts, in other words, similar to our one-time one-year draftees who spent much of their enlistment on the high seas between induction and discharge. The 40th Division (less its prize brigade) is in the field, bivouacked in pyramidal tents near their battle positions and undergoing an intensive training program. Young, alert, excellent morale, fighters but neither seasoned nor numerous. With the elimination of the stabilizing influence (the Gurkha brigade) to the front and with the early departure of the only security force (other than native police) to the rear, one cannot help but wonder whether the military defense of Hong Kong will not go by default, despite the fine English youth that would unquestionably do its best and spill its blood.

b. The Air Force.

As long as the Chinese Communists had no air force it was easy to grant to the British air supremacy in the area. However, with practically all observers now willing to acknowledge a Chinese Communist Air Force of not less than 200 Russian type combat planes the size of the British Air Force in the Hong Kong area assumes new importance. The British complement of the Royal Air Force consists of two squadrons of Spitfires (not over 32 planes) and one squadron of Sunderland flying boats (5 planes). I saw these planes and they appeared obsolescent. The British Air Commander, according to one of our U.S. observers, recently made the following statement: "The air defense of Hong Kong is not on a firm basis and is inadequate". I agree.

c. Navy.

In this respect, the British maintain a definite superiority. When HMS Triumph is in Hong Kong, and not at Singapore, she carries two squadrons of naval planes to reinforce the Royal Air Force. During my visit, besides our own USS Toledo, the British ship complement in port included the aircraft tender Unicorn, a cruiser and about four destroyers. While definitely superior the British naval element views its current task as having been rendered much more difficult by the Communist outflanking maneuver on the west of the colony and their emplacement of shore batteries on the Lan Tau peninsula as well as along the Bias Bay area to the northeast (Tab 3). The Communists recent operations, designed to clear the Ling Ting channel and the Pearl River Estuary have resulted in the seizure of the Chung Shan and Lintin Islands, further encroaching on the Colony.

d. Military Summary.

Whereas in November 1949, we were able to envisage the British militarily capable of an excellent defense at Hong Kong, in May 1950 the means at their disposal have been decreased, while the potential enemy has been strengthened.

4. Political.

a. As soon as one scratches the surface even slightly it is easy to perceive that the British military and the British Colonial Government do not have the same attitude toward the Chinese Communists. The British military are not sympathetic toward the recognition of MAO Tse-tung and furthermore oppose turning over the former Chinese Nationalist transport planes (still at Kaitak) to the Communists. Outside of government circles, the prevailing opinion expressed, both by businessmen and military, is that recognition of MAO was in error.

b. Rankin, our Consul General and an old colleague of Belgrade days, who is very much of an activist in State Department circles spent several hours with me discussing the situation in East Asia. He is personally an advocate of definite commitments by the U.S., backed by military force, and stated repeatedly that we were permitting this area to go by default. He observed that one of our cruisers alone could defend Formosa and chided me on our four divisions in Japan watching ourselves outflanked.

c. As much as I personally dislike the use of the word, the political attitude of the British towards Communist China may be defined as "correct".

5. Economic.

a. Contrary to the impression I had before leaving Tokyo, I did not observe any great shipping activity in Hong Kong waters. While I did not visit the warehouses nor make more than a casual inspection of the docks and wharves I was informed that trade was no longer brisk and that much cargo was in storage. A price index on the U.S. dollar, currently bringing only 6.04 Hong Kong dollars as compared to 6.50 Hong Kong dollars thirty to sixty days ago was attributed to the quantity of U.S. goods held in warehouses.

b. Trade with Communist China was described as seriously hampered by river piracy that has arisen as the Chinese Nationalist Navy has become less active. Probably because of its more spectacular aspect one hears only of strategic materials cargoes at premium shipping rates leaving port. Our Consul General is sending me latest authoritative data on traffic with China.

c. For the time being, food is both plentiful and cheap in Hong Kong. In fact, I observed no shortage of commodities. The fall of Hainan, the principal supplier of fresh meat and vegetables, is expected to have an adverse effect on the local food supply. Shelter is totally inadequate - the city is over-crowded with Chinese refugees. At night, the sidewalks are cluttered with sleeping bodies. I shall be amazed if the city escapes some serious epidemic.

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only temporarily - to Singapore 6 mo

d. Shops contain few customers. In the leading rug, linen and china stores, I found myself alone and received the personal attention of the proprietor.

Compare [illegible] many [illegible] in H.K. D

e. Among businessmen in general there was much talk of abandoning the sinking ship but this I shall describe in the next paragraph.

6. Psychological.

I breakfasted one morning with Sir Robert Ho-tung, reputedly one of the wealthiest men in Hong Kong and a life-time resident. His attitude was typical of that which I found in Paris in 1938. He was determined to make a deal with the Communists to recoup what he could from his Shanghai investments; prepare to purchase or to barter a comfortable asylum in Hong Kong (preferably part of his present estate) "when the Reds take over"; and invest now all tangible assets in South America. His principal object was to discuss with me the relative merits of Peru versus Brazil as a financial safe haven. I can add little to this grim picture. Be it in the hotel, or among businessmen, or among the people in the street, one feels a foreboding of an impending change. May I repeat that Hainan had just fallen; Lintin Island had just been taken; the Chinese Nationalists had again shown no will to fight; and the British were still awaiting diplomatic recognition by MAO while concurrently evacuating the best of their own troops.

generally felt by American who got [illegible]

7. Miscellaneous.

a. Northwest China (Tab 4). Lt Col Harwold (USA Liaison Officer) arranged an interview with General MA, Hung-kwei, Commander of the Fourth Army. MA, Hung-kwei is very much of an optimist, assuring me that he had about 60,000 troops still actively engaged with the Reds in four principal northwest areas (Tab 5). Moslems would never accept Communism and when I asked him what he needed, he replied amazingly "Nothing for twelve months except U.S. planning that would assure replenishment of weapons and ammunition before the expiration of the twelve month period". He expressed deep admiration for General MacArthur.

b. Taiwan. "You can have it as my firm conviction that the end of May 1950 will see Taiwan taken by the Chinese Communists in an amphibious operation and I have so reported to Washington", so says Frederick R. Schultheis, head of the Central Intelligence Agency in Hong Kong. Schultheis claimed to have an excellent intelligence coverage of the Shanghai-Tientsin area and he was certain of both his facts and deductions. He had definite information that the amphibious training phase was to be completed by May 1st and that the Communist Chinese Air Force was now in being, having been trained by the Soviets, near Dairen, and that it now had superiority over the Nationalist Air Force. To Schultheis, Taiwan was in the bag for the Communists and nothing I said in rebuttal would even make him hedge. I had merely to live until the 31st of May 1950 to see CHIANG's Island go the way of all the others. Incidentally, Barrett, USA, and Gelson, USN, of Taipei, who were in Hong Kong awaiting the arrival of Soule, while not specific as to dates, thought the end of Taiwan near.

H.K. is a good place to pick up information [illegible] refugees

No wonder China [illegible]

c. Frontier Control.

Effective May 1st, the British instituted a control of incoming refugees at checkpoints which is intended to equalize the outflow and inflow of Chinese across the border. This measure was taken because of the congested conditions in Hong Kong. I doubt seriously that it can be made effective. From an observation post where I could see several miles of the two hundred foot stream that forms the boundary, numerous sampans were engaged in uncontrolled ferrying of individuals. It would absorb much of the 40th Division were it placed on this river line as a continuous border patrol. At best, the British, with native police, will control vehicular traffic while pedestrians off the penetrants will enter unmolested.

d. Intelligence Possibilities.

With the border leaking like a sieve and with the U.S. dollar an effective permit for entry into Communist China, the Leased Territories afford an Intelligence Agent's dream. The British Intelligence Service appeared to operate no interrogation center. I was informed that their agents were directed only to their immediate front and toward Indo-China (the latter possibly a hold-over of the British versus French counterespionage systems). WANG a partner of Sammy Y. LEE, a rug exporter to our C.P.O., had just returned from Peking four days prior to my arrival in Kowloon. With him had come a load of rugs and camphorwood chests. WANG told me he had travelled to Peking via Nanking and returned unmolested and from him I obtained a corroboration of the alleged 200 Soviet type planes in the vicinity of Shanghai.

e. Chinese Communists on British Front.

As of 2 May there was no concentration of Chinese Communist forces on the Leased Territories front. Only a few men in uniform on bridge control and outpost duty and a liberal sprinkling of Communist flags gave any indication of a nation in arms. The nearest concentration of Chinese Communist forces (and one could hear occasional artillery salvos) is at Nan Tou Peninsula (Tab 3). This Peninsula had provided the debouchment for the seizure of Lintin Island.

8. Summary.

I trust that I may not have minimized the importance that I attach to the secure maintenance of the Asiatic beachhead at Kowloon. Its loss would be psychologically a tragedy.

The situation in that area of China has been created by selfish men with extremely selfish interests. The result is that the rank and file have lost both faith and hope. The battle here, as in other areas, can be won only if the feu sacré can be revived. Unfortunately, the Chinese Nationalists are unwilling to spill blood and the British have made it too apparent they sought primarily a trader's permit. While there is nothing to indicate any immediate desire on the part of Red China to foreclose on this leased property, nonetheless weakness invites trespass.

LOUIS J. FORTIER
Colonel GSC
Director, Theater Intelligence Division

5 Incls
1. Map - Prepared Defense Line
2. British Land Forces in New Territories
3. Concentration of Chinese Communist Forces
4. A Survey of the Situation in the North-west of China
5. Moslem Area of Influence

REGRADED Confidential
By authority of ACSI Ltr dated 2[illegible] March 1959
by D S Tait 1/13/60

A SURVEY OF THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH-WEST OF CHINA

1/20/1956

The four North-western provinces of the Republic of China, Kansu, Ningsia, Tsinghai and Sinkiang are generally called the North-west in China. These four provinces, whose population is sparse but natural resources very rich, are strategically important as situated on the thoroughfare from the Russian frontier to Central China. In the 19th century, by order of the emperor of the Chinese Empire the Viceroy of the provinces of Shensi and Kansu removed his seat of government from Si-an in the province of Shensi to Lanchow, the capital of the province of Kansu, for the purpose of safe-guarding the north-western frontier of the Empire. That has ever been regarded as a wise act so far as national defense is concerned.

The high altitude and severe climate in the North-West make the residents there a very tough as well as thrifty race. Most of them are farmers and nomads, honest, brave or rather chivalrous. When there are local disturbances, people keep watch and come to the help of one another; when wars were declared against foreign countries, they ever answered call for duty. The North-westerners participated mostly in all the campaigns against foreign countries throughout the Ching dynasty. In the so-called Boxers uprising, Gen Hung-pin's uncle Gen Ma-fu lu (   ) died in battle before Chien-men, the famous city gate of Peking, together with many of his kins folks in the ranks. This fully demonstrated the loyalty and bravery of the North-westerners and highly esteemed by the Ching dynasty and their support much sought for.

Since the birth of the Republic in 1911, as there were civil wars often, the Central Government was so much occupied that little attention was paid to the North-west. Until 1926, when Generalissimo Chiang started that famous Northern Expedition from the Southern province of Kwangtung in 1926 which eventually resulted in the unification of the country later on, in the North-west, under the leadership of Gen Hung-kwei's father Gen Fu-hsiang Ma (   ), the various garrison commanders—Gen Ma Lin (   ), garrison commander of Lanchow, Gen Ma Chi (   ) father of Gen Ma Pu-fang (   ), garrison commander of Si-ning, Gen Ma Ting-hsiang (   ), garrison commander of Liangchow, Gen Hung-ping Ma (   ), garrison commander of Ningsia and Gen Hung-kwei Ma, Commander-in-chief of the 4th Route Army – all came to the support of the National Government of Nanking and participated in the Northern Expedition against the Peking Government then established and supported by those warlords like Marshal Chang Tso-lin (   ), Gen Chang Tsung-chang etc., and again participated in the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the second world war and the recent Communist suppression. In the above-mentioned campaigns, under the leadership of Gen Hung-kwei Ma, more than three hundred thousands North-westerners enlisted in the armies. The number of dead and wounded was over forty thousands – what sacrifice in view of the relatively not very large population in those North-western provinces.

After the country had been unified in 1928, the National Government began to adopt the policy of a centralized government, leaving aside the various leaders in different provinces, placing them only in relatively unimportant positions, and, sometimes, even attempting to diminish their power. Consequently, the important positions in these north-western provinces were all filled in by persons directly sent from the National Government at Nanking. But it is very regrettable to say that all those chief administrators and highly responsible officials sent from the National Government to the North-west for these many years have either sided by the Chinese Communist like Mr Shao Li-tzu (   ) or [illegible] (   ), or neglected the situation in the North-west like Gens Chu Shao-liang (   ) and Gen Ku Cheng-lun (   ) that they themselves should be held responsible for the fall of the North-west into the hand of Chinese Communist. What was the worst was the appointment of Gen Chang Chih-chung (   ) to be the Director-General of the North-west and later on the enlargement of his jurisdiction. Gen Chang Chih-chung defected to the Chinese Communist in the last year. Before his defection, he supplied rations and uniforms only enough for forty thousand men for the one hundred thousand soldiers under Gen Hung-kuei Ma, while thirty thousand men rations and uniforms for Gen Ma Pu-fang's fifty thousand soldiers. In spite of Gen Hung-kuei's many repeated requests, not a single piece of modern equipment was granted so that equipments in his army were very old. Most rifles were of Japanese make, .65 calibre, so that in the most critical moment during the battles against the Communist Army in Kansu province in the last autumn, when the supply of bullets for this type of Japanese manufactured rifles were spent, no more fresh supply could be brought up to the front was one of the chief reasons for the subsequent military setbacks. Although the spirit of the troops was excellent, unfailing courage and devotion were of no avail against overwhelming numbers as well as superior equipments. After Gen Chang Chih-chung's defection, the peace preservation corps, under his own special training, [illegible] and guided the Red army from Shensi into Kansu, thus leading to the ultimate fall of the entire North-west into the hand of the Chinese Communist.

Gen Chang Chih-chung's main deed was intrigue concerned with the Sinkiang province. On the one hand, he instigated the Sinkiang Faction to send the demand for autonomy of Sinkiang to the National Government. On the other hand, he recommended to the National Government to appoint Mr Burhan (   ), a naturalized Russian, as the Chairman of Sin-kiang and Gen Tao Shih-yueh (   ), Gen Chang's colleague, as garrison commander. Both Mr Burhan and Gen Tao were subsequently appointed by the National Government. In March 1949, Mr Burhan and Gen Tao came to Lanchow from Sin-kiang and had conferences with Gen Chang, resulting in the signing of the treaty between the National Government and Russian regarding commercial relations between Sin-kiang province and Russian frontier, in spite of protests from the North-western people who had elected Gen Hung-kuei Ma as their representative to voice their protests.

After the country had been unified in 1928, the National Government began to adopt the policy of a centralized government, leaving aside the various leaders in different provinces, placing them only in secondary, unimportant positions, and, sometimes, even attempting to diminish their prestige. Consequently, all important positions in these north-western provinces were all filled in by persons directly sent from the National Government at Nanking. But it is very regrettable to say that all these chief administrators and highly responsible officials sent from the Central Government to the north-west for these many years have either defected to the Chinese Communist like Gen Tao Zi-yue ( ) or [illegible] ( ), or neglected the situation in the north-west like Gens Chu Shao-liang ( ) and Hu Tsung-nan ( ) that they themselves should be held responsible for the fall of the north-west into the hand of Chinese Communist. What was the worse was the appointment of Gen Chang Chi-chung ( ) to be the Governor-General of the north-west and later on the enlargement of his jurisdiction. Gen Chang Chi-chung defected to the Chinese Communist in the last year. Before his defection, he supplied rations and uniforms only enough for forty thousand men for the one hundred thousand soldiers under Gen Ma Pu-fang, while thirty thousand men rations and uniforms for Gen Ma [illegible]'s fifty thousand soldiers. In spite of Gen Ma Pu-fang's repeated requests, not a single piece of modern equipment was granted as their equipments in use were very old. Most rifles were of Japanese make, .65 caliber, so that in the most critical moment during the battles against the reds around Sian in Shensi province in the last autumn, when the supply of bullets for this type of Japanese manufactured rifles were spent, no more fresh supply could be brought up to the front and [illegible] the chief reasons for the subsequent military set-backs. Although the spirit of the troops was excellent, the brave courage and devotion were of no avail against overwhelming numbers as well as superior equipments. After Gen Chang Chi-chung's defection, his peace preservation corps, under his own special training, followed him and guided the red army from Shensi into Kansu, thus leading to the ultimate fall of the entire north-west into the hand of the Chinese Communist.

Gen Chang Chi-chung's most dangerous intrigue concerned with the Sin-kiang province. On the one hand, he instigated the [illegible] to seek the [illegible] autonomy of [illegible] by the National Government. On the other hand, he suggested to the National Government to appoint Dr Burhan ( ), a [illegible] leader, as the chairman of Sinkiang and Gen Tao Zi-yue ( ), Gen Chang's colleague, as garrison commander. Both Dr Burhan and Gen Tao were [illegible] appointed by the National Government. In [illegible], Dr Burhan and Gen Tao took two days to Lanchow from Sin-kiang and had conferences with Gen Chang, resulting in the signing of the treaty between the National Government and Russian regarding commercial relations between Sin-kiang province and Russian frontier in spite of protests from the north-western people who had elected Gen Ma Pu-fang as their representative to voice their protests.

The mountainous North-west are especially suitable for raising animals while the plains along there for cultivation. There are plenty of horses, cattles and camels. These constitute the principal food and means of transportation. Forest and mines are both very rich. Forest extends along the three provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia and Tsinghai. Iron and coal mines have been discovered in these provinces. Gold is found in Sinkiang and Tsinghai. Oil is found in Sin-kiang, Kansu and Tsinghai. The estimated quantity of oil is quite large. Now Sin-kiang is under the control of the Russians, while Kansu, Ninghsia and Tsinghai since their fall into the Chinese Communist have also been included behind the Iron Curtain. Russian has now a free hand to exploit all these natural resources and is building railways and highways not only to consolidate here position there but for a springboard for the conquest of India and South-east Asia.

In this connection we should draw your attention to the fact that in 1934 when Gen Shen Shi-tsai ( ) and Gen Ma Chung-Ying ( ) were fighting for the control of Sinkiang. Gen Shen Shi-tsai sought Russian aid and in response to his request the Eighth Regiment of the Red Army (it was better known in the North-west as the Red Eighth Regiment) was dispatched from Russia to his aid. In fact the Red Eighth Regiment consisted of more than thirty thousand men, scattering over Ili ( ), Tihwa ( ) and Hami ( ). According to reliable information, at present Russian forces in the Northwest of China have been three or four times more than that number, and are scattered from the border between Inner Mongolia and Manchuria to various key points along Outer-Mongolia and Sin-kiang, thus controlling all key positions between Russia and China.

Gen Hung-kwei Ma was born in the North-west and knows very well about the real danger in there. At different times, he had suggested to the National Government about the development of education in these frontier provinces, the readjustment of the system of government by Mongolian princes over the Mongolians, the establishment of camel caravan to facilitate communication — all of these were intended for the stabilization of the frontier provinces so as to check Russian encroachment. Alas, all these efforts were neglected.

At the present moment, we wish to point out that although the North-west has been lost to the Chinese Communists, but what was destroyed is the visible outward form of the Mohammedan Government, the inner thoughts of the Mohammedan people in these four provinces remain faithful toward their religion. The majority of Mohammedan people among the Chinese nation resides in the North-west. By reason of their religious faith, they are naturally hostile to Communism. As the paper currency of the Chinese Communist has been very much inflated, to meet their expenditures, they are levying very heavy taxations and collecting foodstuffs from all people and farmers. But this only means robbery and privation of the people and will leave them no other way than taking up their arms to fight against their usurpers. There are now more than ten groups of natives fighting guerrilla warfare against the Reds. The two largest groups among these belong to Gen Hung-kwei Ma's former troops.

One group consisting of from 20,000 to 25,000 men, is commanded by former division commander Gen Chow Foo-fan, their center of activity being Hai-Yuo (   ) and Ting-Sun (   ). The other group of more than 20,000 men is commanded by former Army Corps Comdr Gen Ma Pu-lin (   ) fighting along the border between Ningsia and Sui-Yuan (   ). Guerrillas in Ningsia Province totals about 10,000 men, subdividing into three groups, very active behind the Reds. In Kansu province, guerrillas usually group themselves together into two or three thousand men. These small groups in Kansu are dealing a heavy blow to the Reds especially in the district of Lin-Shia (   ), formerly called Ho-Chow (   ), the home district of the Ma families. Over there all the Mos have their arms, and are now united against Communist usurpation that no Communist workers dare to go there. In all, there are about 200,000 guerrillas in those three provinces. Should there be unification of command and better employment these men with their simple faith in their religion and their inborn honesty and bravery will no doubt offer the greatest help needed to battle the Communist aggressors.

In case you are interested to lend help to our effort to recover the Chinese mainland, two strategically important places should be given consideration — the North-East or Manchuria as well as the North-West of China. Both places are bordering upon the Russian frontier. Both will be held by the Russians to safeguard their own land. If driven from the North-West of China, opponents of Russia would knock at the door of the Russian Communists. Hence the importance of the North-West.

To liberate the North-West, help from the Mohammedan people is indispensable. It is well known the Mohammedans are good fighters and hostile to Communism. There can be little chance of any compromise between them and the Reds. This can be fully proved by the determined fight by the Ma's troops against the Chinese Communists. Therefore, the solution will be found in selecting and backing up among the Moslem leaders such as enjoy the support of the people so that, when opportunity arrives, he could go back to the North-West to lead his former troops with, of course, whatever you could offer to him from the West and the [illegible] North-East to wipe out those Russian and Chinese Communists — the common enemies of world peace.

In conclusion, it is time now to prepare before it is too late; let us lose no time.